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1Secure Primary Transmission Assisted by a
Secondary Full-Duplex NOMA Relay
Bingcai Chen, Member, IEEE, Yu Chen, Yunfei Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, Yang Cao, Zhiguo Ding, Senior
Member, IEEE, Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, Xianbin Wang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this correspondence, secure primary transmission
is proposed by using a multi-antenna secondary full-duplex non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) relay in cognitive radio
(CR) networks. First, the primary signal is transmitted from the
primary transmitter to the relay. Artificial noise is generated by
using part of the antennas at the relay to disrupt eavesdropping,
without affecting the primary transmission. Then, superimposed
signals are transmitted from the relay to the primary receiver
(PR) and secondary receivers (SRs) via NOMA. The primary
security is guaranteed by the modified decoding order and
beamforming optimization, which is converted to convex and
solved by an iterative algorithm. Simulation results are presented
to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in guaranteeing
the primary security in CR networks.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, cognitive radio, non-orthogonal
multiple access, physical layer security, full-duplex relay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is considered as
a promising technique for radio resource constrained 5G
mobile networks [1]. Among several possible implementation
schemes, power-domain NOMA remains the most popular one,
in which different transmit power is allocated to users accord-
ing to their channel strength, and the transmitted information
is recovered by successive interference cancellation (SIC)
at each receiver [2]. Recently, relay-aided NOMA has been
widely studied due to its superior performance in improving
spectrum efficiency and network coverage concurrently [3]–
[6]. In [3], Wu et al. optimized the power allocation (PA) to
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maximize the throughput for NOMA relay-assisted networks.
Energy efficiency was maximized through PA by Liu et al.
in [4], for cooperative networks using NOMA. In [5], Lv et
al. presented a novel NOMA-based transmission scheme to
deliver the primary and secondary messages via a secondary
relay in cognitive radio (CR) networks. Long-distance primary
transceivers were connected via a secondary NOMA relay to
achieve spectrum sharing by Chen et al. in [6].
Although NOMA can enhance spectrum efficiency, its com-
munication security and confidentiality remain as major chal-
lenges [7]–[10]. In [9], Liu et al. analyzed the security perfor-
mance of NOMA in large-scale networks. Lv et al. proposed
a novel beamforming scheme in [10], in which artificial noise
(AN) is adopted to improve the transmission confidentiality
of NOMA users. However, very few works have been focused
on the security of relay-aided NOMA networks [11] [12]. In
[11], an effective downlink cascaded beamforming scheme was
proposed by Nandan et al. to guarantee the secure transmission
for a two-cell MIMO-NOMA based CR network. In [12],
Zheng et al. proposed a two-way secure transmission scheme
via a full-duplex NOMA relay and AN, in which the relay
with multiple antennas is exploited to ensure the security of
signal transmission between two users. Different from [12],
we propose a two-slot secure transmission scheme assisted by
a secondary full-duplex NOMA relay for CR networks in this
correspondence. The key motivation and contribution of this
paper are summarized as follows.
 We consider the scenario where the primary1 receiver is
far from its transmitter without direct channel, and the
primary user requires secure transmission, which is very
challenging. To solve this problem, the secondary users
aim to perform transmission via NOMA in the primary
spectrum, on the condition that they can help the primary
user to perform secure transmission. Thus, we propose
this secure primary transmission scheme assisted by a
secondary NOMA relay in this paper.
 The proposed scheme can be achieved in two time
slots. First, the primary signal is transmitted from the
primary transmitter (PT) to the relay, which is easy to
be eavesdropped. Thus, we use the full-duplex relay to
generate AN to disrupt the eavesdropping while receiving
the signal from PT, and the AN will not affect the
legitimate transmission.
 The distance between the relay and the primary receiver
1In this paper, “primary” and “secondary” refer to the transmission for the
primary user and secondary users in the CR network, respectively.
2Fig. 1. System model of the secure primary transmission scheme assisted
by a multi-antenna secondary full-duplex NOMA relay.
(PR) is longer than the distances between the relay and
secondary receivers (SRs). According to the conventional
NOMA, the transmit power allocated to the PR is the
highest, which makes primary transmission easy to be
eavesdropped. Thus, in the second time slot, we modify
the decoding order of NOMA via beamforming optimiza-
tion to guarantee the primary secure transmission.
 The beamforming optimization problem in the second
time slot is non-convex and difficult to solve. Thus,
the problem is first transformed into a convex one,
and then solved by an iterative algorithm with reliable
performance.
Notation : kvk represents the the Euclidean norm of vector
v. Ay denotes the Hermitian transpose of matrix A. 5f(x)
is the differential operator of f(x). Re(x) denotes the real
operator of x. CMN denotes the space of complex M 
N matrices. I is the identity matrix. CN (a;A) denotes the
complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance A.
E[x] denotes the expectation of x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cooperative CR network in Fig. 1, in which the
PT with a single antenna transmits xK to a single-antenna PR
with the help of a N -antenna full-duplex relay. For the relay,
it serves the PR and K   1 single-antenna SRs via NOMA.
The unitary transmitted signal for the ith SR can be denoted
by xi, i 2 K = f1; 2; :::;K   1g. Assume that the primary
signal xK is overheard by a single-antenna eavesdropper. It
is assumed that there is no direct link between PT and PR,
due to the strong blockage and path loss between the two
far-separated nodes. The channel strength from the relay to
PR is weaker than those from the relay to SRs, which will
lead to severe security threat to the primary transmission.
Accordingly, assume that the distances from the relay to the
PR and SRs satisfy2
dK  d1  :::  dK 1; (1)
2In this paper, we assume that dK is larger than di; i 2 K, which is
the most challenging case. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme can be easily
extended to the case where dK is not the largest one.
where di is the distance from the relay to the PR (i = K) or
SRs (i 2 K). Thus, the order of the channel-gain expectations
can be expressed as3
E
khKk2  E kh1k2  :::  E khK 1k2 ; (2)
where hi =
q
d i gi 2 C1N , i 2M= f1; 2; :::;Kg, is the
channel vector from the relay to PR (i = K) or SRs (i 2 K).
 is the path-loss exponent,  is the path loss at unit distance,
and gi  CN (0; I) is the Rayleigh fading vector.
The transmit power of PT and the relay can be denoted by
Pp and Ps, respectively.
In this correspondence, we propose a secure primary trans-
mission scheme assisted by a secondary NOMA relay operat-
ing in two time slots. In the first time slot, PT sends xK to
the relay, and we use Nt antennas to generate AN at the relay
while a single antenna to receive xK , where Nt + 1 = N . In
this way, the security of xK can be guaranteed, with the self-
interference at the relay eliminated. In the second time slot, the
relay transmits the superimposed signals to both PR and SRs
via NOMA, with the modified SIC order and beamforming
optimization to guarantee the security of primary transmission.
III. SECURE PRIMARY TRANSMISSION VIA A SECONDARY
FULL-DUPLEX NOMA RELAY
In this section, we describe the secure primary transmission
scheme via the secondary NOMA relay with two time slots.
A. First Time Slot
In the first time slot, the PT sends xK to the relay. The relay
uses Nt = N   1 antennas to generate the AN signal xAN
to disrupt eavesdropping simultaneously. Thus, the received
signal at the single antenna of the relay can be expressed as
yps =
p
PphpsxK + hssvANxAN + ns; (3)
where hps =
q
d ps gps is the channel fading from PT to
the relay. dps and gps are the corresponding distance and
Rayleigh fading coefficient, respectively. ns is the additive
white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance 2 at the
relay. vAN 2 CNt1 is the precoding vector for AN, with
kvANk2 = Ps. hss 2 C1Nt is the self-interference channel
vector.
In order to eliminate the self-interference caused by the AN,
the following condition
hssvAN = 0 (4)
should be satisfied. Since (4) and kvANk2 = Ps are two
different equations with Nt variables, we can derive that they
can only be satisfied when Nt  2.
Thus, we can obtain the achievable data rate at the relay as
Rps = log2

1 +
Ppjhpsj2
2

; (5)
3In the proposed scheme, cooperation between the primary user and
secondary users is needed to synchronize the transmission and exchange the
channel state information (CSI) [13], because the secondary users can assist
the primary user to perform long-distance secure transmission.
3which should satisfy
RK1 = Rps  rK ; (6)
where rK denotes the minimum rate to decode xK . From (6),
we can obtain
Pp  
2(2rK   1)
jhpsj2 : (7)
On the other hand, the received signal at the eavesdropper
can be expressed as4
ye1 =
p
PphpexK + hse1vANxAN + ne; (8)
where hpe =
q
d pe gpe is the channel coefficient from PT
to eavesdropper, in which dpe and gpe are the corresponding
distance and Rayleigh fading coefficient, respectively. ne is
the additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance
2 at the eavesdropper. hse1 =
p
d se gse1 2 C1Nt is the
channel vector from the relay to eavesdropper in the first time
slot, in which dse and gse1  CN (0; I) are the corresponding
distance and Rayleigh fading vector, respectively.
In this paper, we assume that the eavesdropper has the
knowledge of the signal format of the legitimate users, which
is possible as the eavesdropper could be a legitimate but
malicious user in the same network. Hence, when the PT and
the relay start to use the training period in the data packet to
achieve synchronization, the eavesdropper can use the same
training period for synchronization too. In this case, both xK
and xAN can be synchronized to the eavesdropper. In the case
when synchronization cannot be achieved by the eavesdropper,
who is either not a legitimate user of the same network
or does not want to implement complicated synchronization
for eavesdropping, there will be a SINR penalty , as the
eavesdropper will start eavesdropping either too early or too
late. Thus, the achievable signal-to-interference-plus-noise-
ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper can be obtained as
SINRpe =
1Ppjhpej2
jhse1vAN j2 + 2 ; (9)
where 1 is the SINR penalty caused by the asynchronization
at the eavesdropper in the first time slot.
B. Second Time Slot
In the second time slot, the relay transmits the superimposed
signal to the PR and SRs via NOMA, which is expressed as
x =
KX
j=1
vjxj ; (10)
where vj 2 CN1 is the precoding vector of the PR or SRj .
Thus, the received signal at the PR or SRi can be obtained as
yi = hi
KX
j=1
vjxj + ni; (11)
where ni is the additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero
and variance 2 at the PR or SRi. Due to the fact that the
4In the proposed scheme, we do not need the eavesdropping CSI, instead,
we use it only for security analysis.
eavesdropping CSI is not available, we cannot optimize the
secrecy rate directly. Instead, we can minimize the transmit
power allocated to PR.
According to the principle of SIC, the conventional decod-
ing order of NOMA at the PR and SRs can be expressed as8>>><>>>:
jh1vK 1j2  :::  jh1v1j2  jh1vK j2;
:::
jhK 1vK 1j2  :::  jhK 1v1j2  jhK 1vK j2;
jhKvK 1j2  :::  jhKv1j2  jhKvK j2;
(12)
from which we can observe that the power allocated to the
PR is much higher, which will cause potential eavesdropping
towards the PR. Thus, we should minimize the power allocated
to the PR, through which the primary signal will be hidden in
the strong secondary signals. Thus, the SIC order of NOMA
at the PR and SRs can be modified as8>>><>>>:
jh1vK j2  jh1vK 1j2  :::  jh1v1j2;
:::
jhK 1vK j2  jhK 1vK 1j2  :::  jhK 1v1j2;
jhKvK j2  jhKvK 1j2  :::  jhKv1j2:
(13)
Using SIC according to (13), the received SINR at the PR
or SRs to decode xj from SRj can be expressed as
SINRij=
jhivj j2
KP
m=j+1
jhivmj2 + 2
; i 2M; j 2 K; i  j: (14)
Thus, the transmission rate of SRj can be expressed as
Rj = log2

1 +
K
min
i=j
SINRij

; j 2 K; (15)
which should satisfy
Rj  rj ; j 2 K; (16)
where rj denotes the rate threshold of xj . We can also obtain
the SINR at PR for the decoding of xK in the second time
slot as
SINRKK =
jhKvK j2
2
; (17)
and the rate for xK in the second slot can be obtained as
RK2 = log2(1 + SINRKK): (18)
According to (6) and (18), the overall transmission rate of xK
over the two time slots can be expressed as
RK = minfRK1; RK2g  rK : (19)
For the eavesdropper, it receives the superimposed signal
containing both xK and xi, i 2 K, which can be expressed as
ye2 =
KX
i=1
hse2vixi + n0: (20)
hse2 =
p
d se gse2 2 C1N is the channel vector from the
relay to eavesdropper in the second time slot, in which gse2 
CN (0; I) is the Rayleigh fading vector. The received SINR at
4the eavesdropper towards xK can be expressed as
SINRse =
2jhse2vK j2
K 1P
i=1
jhse2vij2 + 2
; (21)
where 2 is the SINR penalty caused by the asynchronization
at the eavesdropper in the second time slot.
Based on (9) and (21), we can obtain the eavesdropping rate
by using the maximal-ratio combining (MRC) method as
Re = log2(1 + SINRpe + SINRse); (22)
Thus, we can obtain the primary secrecy rate as
Rs = [RK  Re]+; (23)
where [x]+ , max(x; 0).
To further improve the security performance of primary
transmission in the second time slot, we minimize the pri-
mary transmit power with the rate threshold of all the users
guaranteed as
min
vi
kvKk2
s:t:
KX
i=1
kvik2 = Ps;
(13); (16); and (19);
(24)
which is non-convex and difficult to solve.
IV. LOW-CONPLEXITY SOLUTION TO (24)
To make (24) convex, a lemma in [14] is first reviewed.
Lemma 1: If f(x) is convex and differentiable, then
f(x)  f(x(m)) +5f(x(m))y(x  x(m)); (25)
where f(x(m))+5f(x(m))y(x x(m)) is the first-order Taylor
expansion around x(m). When x = x(m), the equality holds.
Thus, we can transform (24) into a convex one using Lemma
1. For convenience, we define
Li;j(vj) = jhivj j2; (26)
Fi;j(vj) =
jhivj j2
2rj   1 : (27)
According to [14], the first-order Taylor approximations of
(26) and (27) over a certain v0j can be obtained as
Li;j(vj ; v0j) = 2Re(v0yj hyihivj) Re(v0yj hyihiv0j); (28)
Fi;j(vj ; v0j) =
Li;j(vj ; v0j)
2rij   1 : (29)
In addition, the condition (13) is equivalent to8>>><>>>:
jhivK j2  jhivK 1j2;
jhivK 1j2  jhivK 2j2;
: : : : : : ;
jhiv2j2  jhiv1j2;
(30)
which can be approximated as8>>><>>>:
jhivK j2  Li;K 1
 
vK 1; v0K 1

;
jhivK 1j2  Li;K 2
 
vK 2; v0K 2

;
: : : : : : ;
jhiv2j2  Li;1 (v1; v01) ;
(31)
where i 2M. The condition (16) can be expressed as
SINRij  2rj   1; i 2M; j 2 K; i  j; (32)
which can be approximated as
KX
m=j+1
jhivmj2 + 2  Fi;j
 
vj ; v0j

; (33)
where i 2 M; j 2 K; i  j. The condition (19) can be
expressed as
SINRKK  2rK   1; (34)
and (7). The condition (34) can be approximated to
2  FK;K (vK ; v0K) ; (35)
Thus, the problem (24) can be approximately converted to
min
vi
kvKk2
s:t:
KX
i=1
kvik2 = Ps;
(31); (33) and (35);
(36)
which is convex and can be easily solved. Thus, Algorithm 1
is proposed to calculate the suboptimal solutions to (24).
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for Problem (24)
1: Initialization: Randomly set the initial values v0j , j 2M.
2: Repeat
3: Solve the problem (36) and get the result vj .
4: Let v0j = vj .
5: Until vj is convergent.
6: Output vj .
In addition, the feasibility of Algorithm 1 for (24) can be
proved in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The feasible set of solutions to (36) is within
that to the original (24).
Proof: Define
f(vm) =
KX
m=j+1
jhivmj2 + 2: (37)
Thus, the condition (16) can be expressed as
f(vm)  Fi;j(vj)  0: (38)
According to Lemma 1 and (33), we can obtain
f(vm)  Fi;j(vj)  f(vm) Fi;j(vj ; v0j)  0: (39)
The following expression can be obtained in the nth iteration.
f

v(n)m

 Fi;j

v(n)j

 f

v(n)m

 Fi;j

v(n)j ; v
(n 1)
j

 0: (40)
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When v(n)j = v
(n 1)
j , the equality in (40) holds. According to
[15], Algorithm 1 is convergent. Thus, v(n)j = v
(n 1)
j can be
achieved. Similar conclusions can be obtained by analyzing
other conditions, and we can conclude that the feasible set of
solutions to (34) is within that to the original (22).
When the number of users becomes larger, the limited
antennas cannot satisfy the requirement. In this case, we can
utilize the idea of opportunistic communication to select some
proper users to perform the NOMA transmission in each time
slot [16], and all the secondary users will have the chance to
access the network over several slots.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulation, we consider one PR and three SRs, i.e.,
K = 4. We set N=3. d1=25 m, d2=20 m, d3=15 m and d4=30
m. dps=20 m, dpe=30 m and dse=30 m. r1 = r2 = r3 = 2
bit/s/Hz. 2 =  110 dBm.  = 2:6 and  = 10 4.
First, the secrecy rate of PR is compared in Fig. 2 for
different values of rK for the proposed scheme, the scheme
without AN, the scheme with conventional SIC order and the
scheme with conventional SIC order and no AN. 1=2=1. The
conventional SIC order has been defined as (12). Specifically,
the scheme without AN is actually the scheme exploiting a
half-duplex relay. We use Ps=50 mW for all these schemes.
From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate of PR
increases with rK in all these schemes. Furthermore, the
secrecy rate of the proposed scheme is much higher than
those of the other schemes, which reflects the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme in improving the primary security
performance.
Then, the secrecy rate of PR and the sum rate of SRs in the
proposed scheme are compared in Fig. 3 with different values
of Ps and rK . 1=2=1. From the results, we can see that the
secrecy rate of PR can be guaranteed, which is close to rK ,
while the sum rate of SRs increase with Ps. Furthermore, the
secrecy rate of PR increases and the sum rate of SRs decreases,
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the primary secrecy rate and secondary sum rate of
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when rK increases, which indicates that more resources will
be allocated to PR to improve its secrecy rate.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of secrecy rate and transmission rate of PR for different
values of rK . Ps=50 mW. 1=2=1.
Furthermore, we compare the secrecy rate and transmission
rate of PR for different values of rK in Fig. 4. 1=2=1.
Ps=50 mW. From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate
of PR is close to its transmission rate, which means that the
eavesdropping rate towards the PR is close to 0. Thus, zero
eavesdropping rate indicates that the transmit power of PR can
be effectively minimized in (24) to prevent eavesdropping.
Last, the eavesdropping rate towards the primary user for
different values of 1, 2 and rK in the proposed scheme is
compared in Fig. 5. From the results, we can see that the
eavesdropping rate increases with rK , this is because more
transmit power should be allocated to the primary user to
satisfy its rate requirement. In addition, we can also observe
that the eavesdropping rate increases with 1 and 2, due to the
fact that the asynchronization at the eavesdropper will degrade
the eavesdropping performance.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the eavesdropping rate towards the primary user for
different values of 1, 2 and rK in the proposed scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this correspondence, we have proposed a secure primary
transmission scheme assisted by a secondary NOMA relay. In
the first time slot, the secure information is transmitted from
PT to the relay, while AN is generated by the relay to disrupt
the eavesdropping without affecting the legitimate transmis-
sion. In the second time slot, the information for the PR and
SRs are transmitted from the relay to PR and SRs via NOMA,
and the security of PR is guaranteed through the modified SIC
order and joint beamforming optimization. Furthermore, the
beamforming optimization problem is converted to convex and
solved by an iterative algorithm. Finally, simulation results are
presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
In our future work, we will still focus on other methods to
solve (24) with solutions close to the optimal ones.
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